Russia kills twice: the deadly tactic of double-tap strikes
One of Russia’s tactics in its war against Ukraine is the use of double-tap strikes, which means hitting a target and then attacking it again shortly afterward. Between February 2022 and August 31, 2024, researchers from non-governmental organization Truth Hounds counted up to 36 such attacks across Ukrainian regions, including Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Vinnytsia, and Khmelnytskyi. This tactic was first used on March 1, 2022, when Russia launched two missiles at the Kharkiv Regional State Administration building. The first missile struck in front of the building, while the second hit the roof killing 44 people.
Over the past year, the number of Russian double-tap strikes against Ukraine has escalated significantly. The first eight months of 2024 alone saw 20 verified double-tap attacks, which is more than in 2022 and 2023 combined. The frequency of Iskander missile strikes has increased, but Russia also employs Kalibr cruise missiles, Shahed drones, S-300 systems, and other weaponry for double-tap attacks. Researchers emphasize that a surge in Russian double-tap strikes against Ukraine coincided with the appointment of a new commander of the Missile Forces and Artillery and a new head of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of Defense.
How Russian double taps kill rescuers, police officers and medics
Rescuers, police officers, and paramedics are the most vulnerable to double-tap strikes, since they are the first to arrive at the scene of an attack. Between February 24, 2022, and April 4, 2024, Russian double-taps killed and injured 91 and 348 Ukrainian rescuers respectively. On March 15, 2024, Russia hit Odesa with two Iskander missiles, killing 21 and injuring 75 people. Among the victims of the second strike were paramedic Serhii Rotaru and rescuer Denys Kolesnikov, who had rushed to the scene after the first missile hit. In August 2024, Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) detained an FSB agent who had coordinated the missile attack on Odesa.
У In July Russian forces launched a double-tap Iskander missile attack on the village of Budy in the Kharkiv region, killing 24 people including rescuer Artem Kostyria. According to his colleagues, Kostyria arrived at the scene of the first strike to extinguish fire and assist civilians. Aware of the risk of a second attack, he led people to safety but was unable to escape himself. Police officer Oleksii Koshchii was also killed in the second strike. A total of 25 people were wounded, including rescuers and police officers.
In August 2023, Russian forces launched a missile attack on a residential building in the center of Pokrovsk, Donetsk region, killing two civilians. As emergency responders worked to rescue survivors and recover the dead from the rubble, Russians struck again, this time targeting a nearby hotel. The second strike killed Colonel Andrii Omelchenko of the Civil Protection Service. His colleague, Vitalii Kintz, suffered severe injuries and was hospitalized, but, sadly, died on August,13. Several other rescuers were also injured. This was reported to MIHR by Anatolii Riaboshapka, the attorney representing Kintz’s family. In May 2024, SBU detained spotters responsible for coordinating the double-tap strike on Pokrovsk.
In response to fatalities among rescuers caused by Russian strikes, Ukraine has updated the State Emergency Service (SES) response protocols, including the replacement of body armor vests.
“We lost several rescuers because their body armor did not provide full torso coverage. A larger vest may be less comfortable to work in, but this is a matter of safety, life and death,” emphasized Minister of Internal Affairs Ihor Klymenko.
During the August 2023 Russian attack on Pokrovsk, Russian forces injured 29 police officers in addition to rescuers. Among the injured was law enforcement officer Volodymyr Nikulin. He was widely recognized for his role in the documentary 20 Days in Mariupol. Nikulin was instrumental in evacuating the film crew and their footage when remaining in Mariupol became impossible. Volodymyr moved to Pokrovsk, where he continued his police service. On August 7, 2023, when Russian forces struck the city, he rushed to assist civilians only to be caught in a second strike. The police officer sustained shrapnel wounds.
Another double tap on police officers took place in September. Russian drones targeted a hospital in Sumy twice. The second attack was launched, when police officers arrived at the scene. It killed Colonel Ihor Poladych, a 20-year veteran of the police force.
Journalism under double-tap strikes: how to stay safe and avoid compromising emergency operations
Journalists covering the war and operating at the strike scenes have been increasingly falling victim to Russian double-tap strikes. In April 2024, Russian forces bombarded residential buildings in Kharkiv, killing 4 civilians and injuring 12 people. During one of the secondary strikes, journalist Viktor Pichuhin from Nakypilo suffered a concussion while documenting the aftermath of the attack.
The following day, on April 5, Russia launched five missile strikes on Zaporizhzhia, killing 4 and injuring 20 civilians. Among those caught in the second wave of double taps were media representatives. TSN reporter Kira Oves and Ukrinform correspondent Olha Zvonarova sustained wounds in the second strike.
Ukrainian media professionals keep adapting to battlefield conditions and strengthening safety protocols. Their approach prioritizes personal safety and ensures they do not endanger emergency responders or civilians at the strike scene. According to Nakypilo journalist Yuliia Napolska, her team members must always carry first aid kits, and wear body armor vests and helmets when reporting on the ground. Additionally, every six months journalists undergo medical training to ensure they can provide basic life support. To stay safe while covering active strike zones, media teams maintain communication, track air raid alerts, and warn each other of potential danger. Upon arrival at a damaged site, Nakypilo’s team parks their vehicle facing away from the site and scan the area to identify possible shelter in the event of a second strike. They listen carefully what rescuers say, and take cover when rescuers shout out the “Sky!” warning. If the situation at the scene of strike becomes too dangerous, media representatives leave immediately.
Nakypilo also follows strict rules for the publication of content in time of war, as the premature reporting of missile strikes and their aftermath can put first responders and civilians in danger. That is why media representatives delay publication for 3 hours if the Russians hit civilian targets, and for 12 hours if they hit military targets. However, as Yuliia Napolska explains, if government representatives inform about the shelling earlier, journalists may adjust their timing accordingly.
How Russia terrorized Syria with double-tap strikes
The war against Ukraine is not the first time that Russia has employed double-tap strikes as a tactic. The Syria Justice and Accountability Center documented 58 double-tap strikes between 2013 and 2021. The frequency of these strikes surged after 2015, when Russia intervened in support of the Syrian government. One of the primary victims of double taps are the White Helmets, a Syrian civil defense organization, which has been providing humanitarian aid in war zones since 2014 In 2023, the organization reported that 306 of its rescuers were killed by Russian and Syrian forces, mainly as a result of double-tap strikes.
A pivotal moment came in March 2016, when Russia carried out a double-tap attack on an olive oil factory in Benin. As the White Helmets rescue team rushed to the scene of the initial strike, Russians launched approximately 11 more attacks, killing and injuring several first responders.
In July 2019, warplanes bombed a market in Maarat al-Numan. After first responders arrived at the scene, another airstrike followed, killing more than 80 and injuring nearly 200 people. Russia denied responsibility, releasing video footage allegedly showing undamaged Maarat al-Numan. However, the video actually depicted Al-Hal Market, a different location nearby. Journalists analyzed eyewitness videos, flight logs and pilot communications, and found out that the strike was made by a Russian fighter jet that had taken off from a base approximately 80 km from the attack scene.
In addition, Russia has repeatedly attempted to discredit Syrian humanitarian organizations, accusing them of terrorism, issuing threats of violence, and justifying attacks against them.
As double-tap strikes became more frequent, the White Helmets had to improve their safety protocols. Rescuers now enter an airstrike scene in two teams. The first team promptly assesses the situation, while the second waits for a safer moment to provide aid. They also conduct strategic reconnaissance and track Syrian and Russian aircraft activity. Additionally, the White Helmets use an early warning system to detect potential airstrikes, and provide real-time alerts about incoming threats. Their centers and medical facilities are equipped with light warning signals of the approach of the enemy aircraft.
Double-tap strikes and international law
MIHR expert on international law Andrii Yakovlev notes that the Rome Statute prohibits attacking non-military targets, as well as killing or wounding civilians and personnel involved in aiding the injured or eliminating the aftermath of shelling. The Geneva Conventions also forbid attacks on civilians. However, according to Yakovlev, Russian forces deliberately target Ukrainian medics and rescuers, thereby increasing the number of casualties as emergency services are unable to reach and assist those in need.
“When double-tap strikes become repeated and escalate, they should be viewed as a manifestation of systematic assault, i.e. an act of government policy, and hence as a crime against humanity,” emphasized Andrii Yakovlev.
This article was published with the support of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED). Its content does not necessarily reflect the official position of the EED. The views or opinions expressed herein are the sole responsibility of its authors.
